I. Introduction
This Paper challenges the direction followed by the international legal discourse on occupation and asks whether it adequately reflects the condition of international relations and their governability by international law, at the turn of the 2 1" century. The Paper offers preliminary thoughts on the development and refinement of the concept of occupation and the surrounding legal applications and implications. It is couched within the recent discourses of "failed and fragile states7' and the "responsibility to protect." I argue here that the reality of occupation has now surpassed the confines of the legal concept of occupation as developed in the post World War I1 (WWII) era. To understand occupation, the concept of sovereignty must be brought under close scrutiny. Sovereignty is a legal "fiction" comprising two aspects attributed to the state: External (relations between actors outside the state) and internal (domestic relations).' Sovereignty also denotes the convergence of three competences: Personal, governance (the ability to render public services), and t e m t~r i a l .~ Sovereignty arises under certain conditions which require international recognition. In this framework, occupation represents a state of interference with the external aspect of sovereignty, which consequently infringes also on the state of internal sovereignty.
A contemporaneous and more accurate understanding of occupation requires refinement to reflect its evolving relationship to sovereignty. In this Paper, I suggest considering occupation also as arising from a reverse chain of successive situations interfering with sovereignty. In this display of occupation, at the outset, internal sovereignty becomes "vitiated," which in turn creates a condition conducive to interference with external sovereignty. I further suggest conceptualizing the outcome of this reverse order of impingements on sovereignty as representing a state wherein sovereignty was suspended. ' ' Nkambo Mugenva, Subjects oflnternational Law, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 253 (Max SBrensen ed., 1968). Id.; David Ruzie, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (2kme Partie, 1975) . This approach requires identifying and classifying conditions interfering with internal sovereignty, and attracting the violation of external sovereignty, as well as identifying the succession and overlapping of stages in the process. This Paper represents the beginning of such an analytical enterprise. "Suspension," rather than "transgression," more accurately describes the situation of A fresh look at history suggests that occupation is comprised of instances reflecting a plethora of modes of sovereignty suspension. These instances possess the following common denominators: post-colonial events that are a result of colonial mandates following World War I (WWI)--which were condoned by the League of Nations-to govern foreign territories; succeeded the mandate regime in form of trusteeship and peace-keeping operations after WWII and were administered by the United Nations; and incited contemporary humanitarian interventions and other (post) New World Order collective security operation^.^ Recently, the concept of failed and fragile state (FFS)5 was coined to capture the essence of situations in which internal sovereignty is compromised and corresponding sovereign competences weakened. Concurrently, the impact of mitigated internal sovereignty, often entailing a corresponding weakening of external sovereignty, has propelled the birth of another new term-the responsibility to protect (R2P).6 R2P implies a new and supplementary understanding of limits on external sovereignty juxtaposing lessons learned from interferences with sovereignty with the "classical" concept of occupation (which focuses on inter-state relationships which compromise external sovereignty) and now warrants a review of the applicable law.
In the past several decades, a new form of de facto occupation has become most conspicuous. It is manifest in an amalgam of intra-and inter-state conditions under an ongoing and evolving process whereby sovereign competences have ceased performing their functions effectively, regularly, and in an "orderly" fashion. Transgression suggests a causal relationship that emphasizes intervention and action; whereas suspension is neutral as to the cause and effect, more nuanced, and encompasses a wider spectrum, e.g., action, passivity, drastic alteration but also protracted process and adiustment. Perha~s the definition relatine to music is -the most accurate: "The action of deferring the progression of a part in harmony by prolonging a note of a chord into the following chord, usually producing a temporary discord; an insistence of this, a discord so produced .. ." THE SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2094 (3d ed. 1968) (emphasis added N.G.-0.). I will not elaborate on the relevance of consent in municipal law due to lack of space. These modes are extremely varied and include, for instance, the particular state of sovereignty of Hong Kong prior to and following the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration; Cyprus, especially since 1974; Haiti, Kosovo (Serbia), Somalia (beginning with the 1990s until the writing of this Paper); and Lebanon since the mid 1970s, to mention a few examples. More examples will be addressed herein. which sovereignty is tempered. The situation of states characterized as "failed or '%agile," politically often resembles that of occupation. However, unlike the Hague Law of inter-state occupation,' FFS situations involve non-state actors (NSAs), specifically individuals, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which are recognized subjects of international law only to a very limited extent and largely for the sake of their own protection. Also, FFS situations tend to conjure up images of civil war and asymmetrical war: Ethiopia and Eritrea mingling in Somalia's affair^;^ no man's land in the Kandahar Province exhibiting the Afghanistan government's weakness and coupling it with Pakistan's failings in Waziri~tan;~ Kosovo's unsettled status and Serbia's lack of effective control over the area;I0 and Haiti's precarious government situation. "
Addressing the legal void pertaining to the newly identified FFS condition, the contemporary, ever-evolving concept of R2P1* was coined. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which produced the report "The Responsibility to Protect."14 Mirroring the growing concern for security in a post-Cold War era, R2P was consequently endorsed in the U.N. Secretary General's 2004 report "A More Secure World: Our Shared Re~ponsibility."'~ Arguably, R2P has thus come to represent the activist aspect of the broader concept of human security:
The report endorses the emerging norm of a responsibility to protect civilians from large-scale violence-a responsibility that is held, first and foremost, by national authorities. When a state fails to protect its civilians, the international community then has a further responsibility to act, through humanitarian operations, monitoring missions and diplomatic pressure-and with force if necessary, though only as a last resort. And in the case of conflict or the use of force, this also implies a clear international commitment to rebuilding shattered societies.I6
Although the term FFS is absent from the report,17 and R2P is not limited to FFS situations, it was undoubtedly designed to prevent conditions that can be characterized as FFS. Indeed, in spite of the identified need to "sav[e] lives within countries in situation of mass atrocity"l8 the report lists, in addition to genocide, "mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to disease,"Ig as giving rise to the R2P of "every State when it comes to l4 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, supra note 6. people suffering £rom avoidable cata~trophe."~~ Arguably little if anything then, prevents the international community from considering a condition of a state's degeneration into political decay, or a situation where the FFS is incapacitated, i.e., suspended sovereignty, as harboring a threat to international peace and security. FFS externalization of the internal wrongs consequently falls within the ambit of the new duty to protect,2' while R2P is being turned into a tool to resurrect a state's sovereign c~mpetences.~~ At this backdrop, I further suggest that the FFS suspended sovereignty condition and the triggering of the R2P beg the re-vitalization of the concepts of leasehold and trusteeship. These legal instruments are valuable in both assisting a FFS in reestablishing its sovereign plenary control2' over its temtory and ending an occupationlike situation. Specifically, where neither a belligerent nor non-belligerent occupation Id. While it does not yet elaborate on other possible instances of "avoidable catastrophe" in and from "shattered states," it envisages such possibility by stating that "to redress catastrophic internal wrongs [the international community] is prepared to declare that the situation is a 'threat to international peace and security' [which] is not especially difficult when breaches of international law are involved." Id. 7 202.
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The report reflects the international community's indecisiveness concerning the available and appropriate means to tackle such a situation:
There has been, as a result, a long-standing argument in the international community between those who insist on a "right to intervene" in man-made catastrophes and those who argue that the Security Council, for all its powers under Chapter VII to "maintain or restore international security," is prohibited from authorizing any coercive action against sovereign States for whatever happens within their borders.
Id.
While some interpret this debate as driven by advocates of a revival of hegemoniclimperialist designs of international law on the one hand (for this comment I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer), it can also be read as leaving the door open for a wider interpretation of the means available to address the threat, namely within the "spanning a continuum involving prevention, response to violence, if necessary, and rebuilding shattered societies," on the other hand. Id. Certainly, the U.N. authorized foreign military intervention at the contemporary stage of legal development excludes pre-emptive action. Alvarez attributes precisely such intention to the U.S. protagonists of the R2P: "R2P treats sovereignty as more hindrance than protection and the U.N. Charter less as sovereignty's guarantor than the guarantor of the rights of individuals." Alvarez, supra note 17, at 12. Intervention is permissible only in situations of international armed conflict orpost bellum, e.g., peacekeeping, peace-building but also in new post 911 1 borderline situations as the Afghanistan intervention mode suggests. Not coincidentally, this matches well the general thrust of the report's discussion of the R2P
: It is open-ended, foreseeing--even endorsing-the development of international law. If this is so, then the concept of R2P, which is still in its infancy, may also benefit from other legal opportunities made available by the concept of suspension of sovereignty. l2 This should absolutely not be confused with what Alvarez refers to as imperial driven "conditional sovereignty" (Alvarez, supra note 17, at 11). 23 Formerly referred to in the U.N. Charter as self-government and independence.
is being acknowledged, the institution of trusteeship, enabled or substituted by a leasehold agreement, offers an elegant and perhaps face-saving outlet.24
In this paper, I focus on the example of Lebanon where (similar to some of the previously mentioned examples) sovereign competences have diminished significantly. Particularly, from 1970 onwards, different periods were extracted out of the purview and control of the Lebanese government. These territories did not remain vacant; rather they were placed under foreign state and/or local NSA domination. Such was the situation in South Lebanon during the control by the Israeli proxy South Lebanese Army (SLA); direct Israeli military occupation; the presence of Syrian forces throughout the rest of the country; and Hezbollah controlled "enclaves" within a Beirut neighborhood and widespread areas in South Lebanon. Precisely because these lands have not remained without governance, the possibility of occupation, albeit of a "non-classic" belligerent formZS deserves consideration. Particularly interesting in the Lebanese situationz6 is the inter-state relationship, e.g., Lebanon-Syria-IranIsrael, which has been intricately interlaced in a state-to-NSA web as played out in the relationship Israel-SLA on the one hand, and Iran, Syria, and Lebanon-Hezbollah, on the other hand. While politically representing a FFS situation, no equivalent encompassing de jure characterization of such situation exists as yet. A legal concept of suspended sovereignty, as a new recognized characteristic of occupation, may offer a peaceful alternative to military intervention.
Review of the Legal History of the Concept of "Occupation"
International legal concepts are born out of international political necessity. The evolution of the concept of occupation is no exception. Now is a suitable moment 24 Lebanon's seven-point plan's suggestion to place the Shab'a Farms under United Nations jurisdiction pending a permanent delineation of the boundary more than hints at such possibility. 
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With the exception of the Israeli occupation after the 1967 war, all other occupants after World War I1 refrained from resorting to The Hague Regulations or the Fourth Geneva Convention as the source of their authority or as a guide to their actions. The propensity to avoid the regime of occupation is particularly noticeable in the various occupations of the 1970s and early 1980s. These occupations, the international reaction to them, and other international developments during this era, have greatly complicated the law of occupation.
Id. at 180.
Recent occupants did not view themselves as occupants and, for reasons discussed above, preferred to confer responsibility on local governments they established. As a result, occupants+xcept for Israel with regard to the territories occupied in 1 9 6 7 4 i d not have to struggle with the adaptation of the law of occupation to the contemporary challenges of administration. Thus, for example, aside from the interpretation of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations by Israeli institutions, no other state practice with regards to this basic article exists after World War 11. The overwhelming magnitude of the problematique concerning the discrepancy between factual situations similar to occupation, on the one hand, and the extant international law, on the other hand, resonates in the work of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law.3S While non-international conflict (which often captures the condition of a FFS, or of foreign involvement in a third state amounting to "occupation like" conditions) is regulated by the Additional Protocol I1 to the Geneva C~nventions,~~ which governs the duration of the armed conflict, the end of the noninternational conflict remains a non-addressed issue. Consequently, a post bellum like situation remains excluded from the law of non-international conflict. Let us, however, assume for the sake of argument, that occupation is being recognized as a possibility in a non-international conflict. Then, will the application ofArticle 43 of the Hague Regulations on belligerent occupation and peace-building offer any guidance? Dinstein's focus on the distinction between executive and legislative functions brings the legal challenge into the fore: The first obligation has to be implemented by the executive (and the judicial) branch of the Military Government of the Occupying Power, whereas the second obligation devolves on the legislative branch.
In the final analysis, the first obligation requires acts of commission: the Occupying Power must take the necessary and proper measures in order to restore and ensure public order and life. Conversely, the second duty postulates primarily acts of omission: avoiding the repeal or suspension of existing laws, except in cases of "empCchement ab~olu."~' Unlike during occupation (in an international conflict), the victorious party in a non-international conflict will most likely be already occupying not only the executive but also judiciary and legislative positions (e.g., it may be a coalition of previously rival parties, or a result of a de facto territorial cession). To be sure, it is precisely the purpose of the actor challenging the incumbent government in a non-international conflict to change the laws in force.38 This clearly contradicts the This, for instance, has been the argument of entitlement inherent in struggles for self-determination, which have come to be considered an inter-national type of conflict: "The claim of the lawful objective of parties in an international armed conflict as envisaged by the Hague law of occupation.39 Therefore, a party in a non-international conflict will be neither struggle for self-determination . . . coupled with the notion of illegal 'foreign occupation' could seem to import major qualifications, indeed, a revolution, in the law of occupation." BENVENISTI, supra note 27, at 187. 39 For example:
In accordance with the second part ofArticle 43, the Occupying Power must respect " l a lois en vigueu" (the laws in force) in the occupied territory, except in cases of "emplchement absolu." Respect means that-as spelled out in the Brussels Declaration-the Occupying Power has to maintain the laws in force and not modify, suspend or replace them with its own legislation. The term "les lois" appears to encompass only promulgated laws (whether basic or trivial; national or municipal; civil or criminal; substantive or procedural). Yet, there is no indication that the framers of the Hague regulations intended to exclude from the ambit of Article 43 "common law," tribal law (especially of indigenous and nomadic people) or other forms of domestic customary law.
Dinstein, Legislation under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations: Belligerent Occupation and
Peacebuilding, supra note 37, at 4. Also, consider the following:
5. Protocol I1 includes language, political or other opinion, and national or social origin as prohibited bases of adverse distinction. These criteria are drawn from the law of human rights. Whereas it is clear that there is an increasing overlap of human rights law and the law of armed conflict, particularly in non-international armed conflict, the extent to which customary international law encompasses these expanded grounds is unclear in the latter context (bearing in mind that a non-international armed conflict usually involves a political dispute or clash between ethnic groups). The extension of rules applicable in international armed conflict "has not taken place in the form of a full and mechanical transplant of those rules to internal conflicts; rather, the general essence of those rules, and not the detailed regulation they may contain, has become applicable to internal conflicts." Therefore, one should be cautious whenever applying provisions--or interpretations thereof-intended for application in international armed conflict to situations of noninternational armed conflict (see paragraph 7 of the commentary accompanying Rule 1.2.3).
Peacebuilding, supra note 37, at 2 1. And furthermore:
6. Since a non-international armed conflict may consist in part of riot situations, it is important to bear in mind that the use of riot control agents to control a riot is perfectly permissible. Admittedly, it is not always easy to determine when a riot has ended and "above the threshold fighting has started (see discussion of the threshold issue in the commentary accompanying Rule 1.1).
Peacebuilding, supra note 37, at 34.
able nor willing to comply with these rules.40
Certainly, a major factor contributing to the insufficiency of the legal concept of occupation consists in the evolution of the nature of armed conflict; the blurring of the boundary between international and non-international conflict; the emerging of the asymmetric war; and the ensuing challenge to the prevailing concepts of international legal per~onality.~' Lebanon serves as a quintessential example. An observation of the state of governance and exercise of sovereignty at the turn of this century, suggests a gap between the current doctrines of occupation and legal personality on the one hand, and political fact, on the other hand. The state of Lebanon has been troubled by internal rifts, carried on from pre-independence and lasting ever since, in spite of efforts to regulate the tense heterogeneous web of Lebanese political relationship by means of a political arrangement4' Lebanon's susceptibility to external influences This relates also to Harris' (supra note 27) concern with multilateral occupation and nationbuilding. 41 War, the difficulties encountered by the U.N. International Investigation Commission investigating the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri as well as the current highly volatile political stalemate in the country clouded by a series of yet unexplained assassinations of eight anti-Syrian politicians since 200447-a11 represent a specific confluence of intra-and inter-state factors demonstrating the sovereign's incapacitation. This is a conspicuous example illustrating how FFS conditions operate as a magnate attracting foreign intervention and amounting to a not-yetlegally-identified form of occupation. In this fissure, where a state of suspension of sovereignty has been established, and where other actors actively and effectively rival the official and formal government over "1 'ordre et la vie publics en respectant, sauf empichement absolu, les lois en vigueur duns le pays,"48 occupation appears to take on an additional and new form.
In the course of modem history, legal instruments were developed to address a 'Void" in sovereign competences. These arose in the context of colonialism in preWestphalian societies and included protectorate^^^ such as the post WWI grant of the power of international legal mandates to governments to administer foreign territories on behalf of the League of NationsS0 and were consequently reformulated into trusteeships after WWII. These were no longer administered through the intermediate of a foreign government but rather by a "consortium" of governments, i.e., the whether the essence of sovereignty reflects pre-colonial legal situations in non-European polities. This is an issue too complex to address here for it requires the comparative study of, at least, the European, Communist, and Development doctrines of international law, and discussion of the concept of terra nullius. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.
Suffice it here to mention that there are several international legal arrangements ranging on a continuum, and representing, albeit indecisively, situations wherein sovereign competences have been suspended, even relinquished. The protectorate and the vassal relationship tend to the latter engagements, which at face value, purport to be consensual United Nations. The protectorate, mandate, and trusteeship, respectively, represent successive stages in international law's development in addressing situations of "lack" or "partial" sovereignty and their relation to occupation (foreign rule). Thus, the mandate system was innovative in two main respects. First, it provided for the three categories of the mandates reflecting the three "degrees of preparedness" for independen~e.~' It is, however, clear that at least in one type of mandate (type A), foreign administration was established over territory conquered by a sovereign.52 The second innovation of the mandate doctrine compared it with the protectorate (and the colonial protectorates) which consisted as a trusteelagent. The mandate represented powers "on behalf' of the League of Nations (an international organization, not a sovereign) and under its authoritative s u p e~i s i o n .~~ The fact that the successor of the Article 22 of the Covenant of the League ofNations. For instance, Iraq and Jordan were considered to be at an advanced stage of independence for their internal and external relations proved to possess "a measure of international personality even before they attained full independence." Mugerwa, supra note 1, at 264. I will not elaborate on the three categories for lack of space. I will therefore forego the discussion of status of occupied territories that formed previously part of a sovereign state but were "tom" from it, only to be placed under mandate administration, and subsequently handed over to U.N. trusteeship management. 5Z In the case of territories "lost" by Turkey and Germany, which were defeated in an armed conflict (WWI), the transfer of territorial powers was settled by means of a peace treaty-and assigned to several states, notably Britain, France, Belgium, and Japan. was regulated by resolutions of the League Council. agreed upon with each Mandatory, the latter required to report annually to the League Council. A Permanent Mandates Commission consisting of independent experts examined the reports and advised the Council respectively. Inhabitants of the mandated territories were legally entitled to petition the League, and disputes regarding the mandates were justiciable before the Permanent Court of International Justice. Consequently, "the mandatory or trust power exercised a defacto sovereign power over the territory. But the exact nature of the de jure position has never been clear and has given rlse to a number of conflicting theories." Mugerwa, supra notc 1, at 264.
mandates-the trust territories-were smaller in size and population in comparison with the mandated territories, and that the trusteeship system of the United Nations eventually "evaporated," bespeaks the arrangement's shortcoming^.^^ All of this, however, does not invalidate the fundamental thrust ofboth mandate and trust doctrines, namely that the population @eople) of territories under international tutelage deserves the protection and assistance of the international community, for a limited term, to support them in either establishing or recovering their sovereign competences.
In conclusion, where the new scope of actors exploits or enhances the debilitation of the sovereign's competences, these competences become suspended and a new de facto form of occupation (neither explicitly belligerent, nor consensual) is established. This factual scenario calls for a de jure doctrine of o c~u p a t i o n .~~ A new law will supplement the Hague and Geneva law of occupation by (a) identifying a new status of occupation, and (b) expanding the arsenal of regulative provisions to include limited term trusteeship as a means towards ending (reversing) the suspended condition of the sovereign's competences.
Suspending SovereignV6 and de facto Occupation: Lessons from Lebanon
In this Paper, I argue that under a certain FFS situation, a legal condition of suspension of sovereignty ought to be identified. It arises where the sovereign (its government) is " These shortcomings suffered also from lack of clarity in the transition of the mandate system from the extinct League of Nations to the trusteeship system of the United Nations. Dinstein The notion of sovereignty has also defied a uniform definition. Its essential components parallel those of a state itself-territory, population and government-but as many as 12 distinct and overlapping meanings of sovereignty have been identified as the term applies to states, and Fowler and Bunck admit that the meaning "varies according to the issue that is being addressed or the question that is being asked. denied control over part of, or the entire, state territory due to (a) paramilitary control by a NSA, and where the situation cannot be characterized as a non-international armed conflict; (b) foreign military indirect control but no direct armed confrontation with the state's military or other armed forces; and (c) the sovereign did not formally andfor freely consent to the foreign intervention. Suspended sovereignty, therefore, combines elements similar to the current legal concept of non-belligerent occupation with a highly incapacitated FFS condition. It emerges from the triangular interface of inter-state, state-NSA, and state-international relations. With this background in mind, it logically follows that international law turn to address two issues relevant to suspended sovereignty: First, the specific essence of occupation in a FFS condition5' and second, the restitution of sovereignty.
Lebanon is the quintessential proto-type of a FFS whose sovereignty has been suspended and matches the expanded concept of occupation proposed here. Lebanon's protracted submission to Syria, Israeli interference with Lebanese sovereignty, PLO's effective control over sections of its territory, and increasing Iranian mingling in Lebanese affairs represent a case in point. The 2006 Lebanon War exposed to the world that the Lebanese government's failure to exercise its powers over and control its own territory had reached a new climax. Here, a particular constellation of intra-and interstate conditions converged into a grey zone falling neither within non-international, nor international, conflict and hence transcending mere occupation. The southern part of the country and a specific municipal neighborhood in the capital of Beirut 99 (2007) . 57 Where the "modem occupant" (BENVENISTI, supra note 27, at 147) runs to the assistance of a presumably aid requesting state; or, where the occupant exercises effective control in the foreign state but eschews admitting to it (most likely for political reasons), consequently avoiding (or preventing) the application of the rules of occupat~on. Id were removed from the purview of the Lebanese government and became effectively controlled by the H e z b~l l a h .~~ This legally non-definable "hybrid" actor epitomizes a combination of a non-insurgent (until after the Lebanon War), yet paramilitary, organization partly representing a NSA-an Iranian surrogate supported by Syriaand partly a state actor-with elected representation in the Lebanese government both in the cabinet and in the o p p o~i t i o n .~~ The ensuing situation of Lebanon defies legal characterization. It does not fit within the scope of Article 42 of the Hague Regulations; the claim that Hezbollah represents a foreign army establishing its control over foreign temtory is unlikely. Equally, the Fourth Geneva Convention cannot be invoked because it does not involve the protection of individuals from foreign rule; on the contrary, the majority of the local population within the territory appears to be supportive of the "unofficial ruler" (the Hezbollah). Likewise, the two Additional Protocols are irrelevant to the situation for most of the length of its duration. In addition, currently60 there is neither a legally recognized international nor non-international armed conflict in Lebanon.
This state of affairs gives rise to crucial questions. Does the situation reflect a conscious andfiee decision by the Lebanese government to abstain from governing the southern part of the country as well as to refrain from entering rehgee camps, and therefore qualifies as an expression by the sovereign government regarding the exercise of its plenary sovereignty over all of Lebanon? If the answer is yes, and assuming for the sake of the argument that Hezbollah's control is classified as occupation, any Lebanese government decision may be taken as implying consent, i.e., resemble the situation of non-belligerent occupation. Facts on the ground, however, refUte this alternative. The Lebanese Prime Minister, Fouad Siniora, and members of his cabinet, have for several months spent most of their time in hiding, and have been running the state's affairs out of a five-star hotel in Beirut rather than from the official government premises. Moreover, their freedom of movement across the country they have been elected to politically govern is practically circ~mscribed.~~ Foreign states (Syria, Iran, and Israel) continue to intervene in the country and although Syria withdrew from Lebanon, a threat of renewed use of military force is constantly looming in the background. There is currently no operative and representative government in Lebanon (whether democratically elected or not), that is capable of either consenting to, or withholding consent against, foreign intervention. Lebanon's sovereignty therefore, is suspended; it is in an expanded mode of oc~upation.~~ I now turn to a more detailed discussion of the relationship between the proposed legal concept of suspended sovereignty and FFS, on the one hand, and R2P, on the other hand.
A. Fragile/Failed State
There is no legal definition applicable to the condition of FFS. The term has been developed as part of an attempt to institutionalize the challenges facing the U.N. at the dawn ofthe 21" century.63 Lebanon, which falls squarely within this political category, 6' MacKinnon, supra note 58. 62 Instinctively, the particular version of occupation suggested here represents essentially a special condition within the FFS situation. However, I am not excluding the possibility that further and comparative research will find otherwise. Arguably, the condition in the Waziristan region of Pakistan, Darfur in Sudan and the spillover into nearby Chad and Somalia are just a few examples which lend support to a thorough consideration of the proposition of a legal concept of suspended sovereignty. Although each of these examples represents a unique case, and neither is identical to the Lebanese scenario, all share a mix of situations falling into the legal void between an international non-armed conflict and non-international non-armed conflict. By what criteria does one identify a state "sliding towards collapse"? More difficult still, one imagines, will be to persuade a state thus identified to accept the 'invitation to attend' a meeting of the commission [proposed UN Peacebuilding Commission]. Even so, the rationale behind and the analysis that accompanies the proposal are convincing and well supported: "failed states" or "states in distress" clearly pose profound challenges to the UN membership as a whole.
"This loss of capacity of the traditional individual state of the 21" century to perform its functions for the people is not only a loss of factual power, might, strength and means. It is a structural loss and therefore it concerns all states, not only the 'failing state' ..." Steiger, supra note 56, at 98 exemplifies the challenge. To arrive at a legal characterization, the status of a FFS must be determined in relation to the legal concept of sovereignty. Two instances of sovereignty are pertinent here: State sovereignty, which is critical for a diagnosis of a condition of FFS, and sovereignty of other political entities and international organizations, which becomes relevant in relation to the restitution to full sovereignty and hence applies to the R2P.
In the first instance, namely state sovereignty, two closely related concepts are of crucial importance: Territorial sovereignty and title to sovereignty. Territorial sovereignty may be original or deri~ative.~" A state cannot exist without sovereignty and both are intrinsically connected. Being a state implies, by definition, sovereignty under international law.6s Lebanon would not be a state without its territory, which it acquired in a derivative mode gaining independence in 1943 from its tutelage under the French Mandate for Syria. Title to sovereignty, which is closely connected to territorial sovereignty, emphasizes the notion of title. It thus concerns both the factual and legal terms under which temtory is deemed to belong to one particular state only, and embodies the essence of temtorial sovereignty in the sense that as a sovereign over territory, the state enjoys a certain type of competence-sovereign competence-which is a consequence of the title. It is used for comparative purposes in determining competing claims to territorial ~overeignty.~~ It comprises an essential and necessary element, namely the power of disposition. While this power may be limited by treaty, the title however remains unaffected as long as the limitation on the power of disposition is not (emphasis added). The challenges have been chronicled in the works of the U.N., beginning with the listing in the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, supra note 6, specifically the protection of citizens from man-made catastrophes such as mass murder, rape, starvation, i.e., humanitarian disasters and which are often related to other catastrophes (e.g., man-made environmental degradation, poverty, etc.) identified as necessary ingredients of human insecurity. Danwall, supra note 56, at 23.
Traditional international law provides five modes of acquisition of temtorial sovereignty;
[sic] occupation, prescription, accretion, cession and conquest. These are divided into original and derivative modes. An original acquisition is obtained through occupation or accretion and involves no transfer of sovereignty from a previous sovereign. The remaining modes are derivative and involve a transfer of sovereignty from a previous sovereign. The manifestation of title may take on different forms, depending on temporal and spatial condition^.^^ When a sovereign state distributes its sovereign competences to other state~,6~or disposes of its territory, it will nevertheless continue to possess titular, residual or nominal sovereignty (or engage in divided sovereignty in form of a condornini~rn).~~ In contradistinction, the state exercising plenary power over the territory, but lacking the capacity of ultimate disposal, possesses only efective sovereignty. It is crucial to note that the doctrine envisages sovereignty only vertically and not horizontally, meaning that the sovereign state retains the highest authority. "[Rlesidual and effective power, together make up the totality of ~overeignty."~~ At the diagnostic stage of a FFS condition, the distinction between residual and effective sovereignty becomes instrumental. I argue that a FFS condition is established when the residual and effective sovereignties collide72 at the point where they, in fact, negate each other. In theory, this may be referred to as a suspension of sovereignty, in other words, a temporary freezing of the competences corollary to sovereignty. Legally, territorial sovereignty is not transferable to a NSA, either domestic or foreign (e.g., of the sort of the Hezbollah) or an international organization (e.g., the U.N., for that matter). Even if this was legally possible, such transfer would require to be made by explicit conventional or implicit customary legal avenues.73 Lebanon did not recognize the Hezbollah as a government of any state. Even assuming that Syrian involvement in Lebanon were consensual and not under duress, while this might amount to derogation74 from owning complete sovereignty, it could not qualify as transfer of sovereignty to Syria. Factually, however, Syria has been possessing effective control, and the Hezbollah continues to exert effective power in parts of Lebanon; both have been doing so to the detriment of Lebanon's own efective sovereignty. Because Lebanon has long lacked conjoint effective and residual power over its territory-and the derogation from its sovereignty conflicts with the effective Cited in id. at 27. 72 Rather than mutually complementing, e.g., in case of a treaty representing disposition of power over territory. For the various ways available to divide sovereign competences see Strauss,
Guantanamo B q and the Evolution of International Leases and Servitudes. supra note 56, at 6. powers exercised within its territory by Syria and Hezbollah (as well as Iran75 and Israeleit seems more accurate to define its situation as a FFS condition of suspended sovereignty.
B. R2P: Responsibility to Protect
Developing in tandem with the notion of FFS is the newly evolving norm R2P. Stahn describes the evolution of the concept as "almost like a fairy tale. Id, These Serbia findings will have to be woven into the hture debate on the R2P. They challenge the "legislators" of international law to explore approaches by which the legal lacuna in the gap separating the responsibility of the state from the responsibility of the NSA, must be filled. I an, suggesting that the notion of suspended sovereignty might serve this purpose.
of the FFS,82 it pointedly penetrated the core of the legal construct of sovereignty. R2P "is testimony to a broader systemic shift in international law, namely, a growing tendency to recognize that the principle of state sovereignty finds its limits in the protection of 'human sec~rity."'~' This propelled a reconsideration of the concept of sovereignty for twenty first century purposes. The legal contours of the R2P have been discussed extensively in the larger contexts of state responsibilityE4 and humanitarian intervention (including the tension existing between military and humanitarian inter~ention).~~ The doctrinal discourse of both state responsibility and humanitarian intervention wrestles with the question of establishing when a state's abdication of responsibility justifies foreign intervention, and when foreign intervention transforms into foreign o c~u p a t i o n .~~ It is precisely at this convergence-R2P "links" with FFSto create the point where deterioration in the FFS (severe clash between residual and effective sovereignty) is recognized as an instance of suspended sovereignty.
Hypothetically, operationalizing an eventual legal R2P duty into actual policy would trigger both domestic and extra-territorial jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, which is commonly considered as a component of sovereignty, may be exercised also without owning title to territ~ry.~' Consequently, when territorial jurisdiction, which is "prima facie exclusive, over a territory and the permanent population living there,"88 has been severely tampered with under the condition of a FFS, WP-through invoking extraterritorial jurisdiction of foreign actors-may assist in resurrecting the suspended competences of the sovereign. 
C. International Trusteeship
My argument in favor of enforcing extra-territorial jurisdiction where the sovereignty of a FFS has been suspended, builds on existing legal forms of interference with territorial integrity: Lease, servitude, trust, mandate, protectorate, colony, and occupation. Specifically, the lease and a re-vitalised concept of trusteeship as governing the lease are potentially instrumental both as a political means of rapprochement (confidence building) between conflicting parties (state and NSAs alike) as well as a legal means to settle disputes. They therefore offer a legal tool to "resuscitate" a state's suspended sovereignty. To be sure, U.N. Charter Chapter VII, specifically Articles 40 and 41, and complementarity to Article 43, provide for the U.N. extra-territorial jurisdiction requisite for the application of an (eventually) rejuvenated Chapter XI1 on the International Trusteeship System.9o To be effective, this U.N. extra-territorial jurisdiction, when applied to the FFS suspended sovereignty situation, must be centralized under the organization's auspices and be unified and directly attributable to the U.N., not delegated to member states' individual jurisdictional di~cretion.~' Such extra-territorial jurisdiction might be facilitated if established in either a lease agreement, where a recognizable government is still legally representative of the FFS (e.g., Lebanon prior to the current political stalemateg2), or in a trusteeship should a central government no longer exist (e.g., S~malia,~' or during an interim period such as in Afghanistan after the ouster of the Taliban government and concomitantly to the arrangement following the Bonn Agreement 200 194).
Territorial leases are recognized in international relations and law as an instrument enabling a state to exercise control over territory without owning sovereignty over it.95 As Danwall writes:
[tloday legal scholars define international territorial leases as legal rights exercisable by states over the territory of other states, which fall short of absolute sovereignty. These rights are attached to the territory and as such they may be enforced even though the ownership of the particular territory subject to the rights has passed to another sovereign, or in other words they are rights in rem.96
International trusteeship represented a legal reform developed by the drafters of the U.N. Charter, adopted after the mandate system of the League of Nations started crumbling. The purpose was to oversee the transition of colonies to independence states; its "[mlajor goals were to promote the advancement of people in the Territories and to promote their development toward self-government and independence."' From a governance perspective, the FFS situation is comparable to that of a colony prior to selfdetermination. The opportunity of reviving98 this means of international governance was not included in the work of the High Level Panel appointed by the U.N. SecretaryGeneral and charged with proposing reforms, specifically regarding collective security. 99 It is, however, not too late to backtrack and amend this oversight.
Interstate leasing emulates the concept of lease in private law and includes three main elements: Rights of the lessee, duration of arrangement, and compensation to be paid to the lessor.'00 As the definition of international legal personality expands and with the inclusion therein of the international organi~ation,'~' and as new needs arise in regulating relationships among diverse international actors, there is no reason to foresee new circumstances for an international leasing where the lessee is an international organization and the lessor-a state.
The international community, as the trustee of the FFS, may assign a state or a group of states, or an international organization, the lease of territory from the FFS for the purpose of reconstituting authentic governance and returning the state into "active" sovereignty. A chief advantage of such an arrangement lies in the establishment of unequivocal jurisdiction.lo2 That such determinacy is desperately needed in a FFS has been demonstrated on several occasions in Lebanon, for instance, where UN military observer forces lacked the mandate to effectively fulfill the original purpose of their Where sovereignty has been suspended, establishing a trusteeship is a first step toward the resurrection of sovereignty. However, trusteeship cannot be established in a legal vacuum. Arguably, the viability of a trusteeship depends on the effective control IW Strauss, supra note 95, at 1. lo' Albeit at a status, and with competences, different from that of the state. Io2 At present, jurisdictional indeterminacy is plaguing both the institution of inter-state leasing and U.N. Charter, ch. VII, operations. On the one hand, the Guantanamo Bay experience is an example for jurisdictional indeterminacy where a bilateral lease and the leased territory are used to enable the lessee (U.S.) to by-pass application of its own domestic jurisdiction and international commitments. On the other hand, the NATO operation in Afghanistan serves to show that where the international community has established its extra-territorial jurisdiction (U.N. Charter, ch. VII) it has failed, in some respects, to measure up to the requisite standards of the rule of law. NATO forces' jurisdiction which must co-exist with the Afghan domestic jurisdiction, e.g. in the treatment of detainees handed over by NATO forces to the Afghan government, is a growing concern for it renders the extra-territorial jurisdiction ineffective. A specific example is the recent debate regarding Canada's role in the violations of rights of detainees transferred to the Afghan authorities, and the "dead e n d situation Canada (as well as other NATO members operating in Afghanistan) faces in its actual ability to comply with both the by the trustee. Therefore, a situation such as Lebanon-where a sovereign FFSs was subjected, without its consent, to the control of, and was torn apart by, foreign states and a NSA104--entails also a new approach to trusteeship. The trustee must be able to engage all actors upon which the restitution of the sovereign competences hinges. This, in turn, requires clarification of the status of the relevant actors in international law, i.e., their rights and obligation^.'^^ The second step following the establishment of a trusteeship regime consists of entering into a co-joint lease agreement with either a central government, if such authority exists, or lease-like agreements with actors controlling sections of the FFS territory.lo6 The lease or lease-like arrangements will buttress the exercise of the trusteeship in an orderly legal fashion; they may encourage rivaling parties to negotiate a settlement and could potentially function as a trust building measure. They will add certainty and resolution to the application of U.N. Charter Chapter VII provisions, and consequently empower the FFS not only the NSA willing to reach an agreement. The FFS would be recognized as a party in a lease, not as a dependant in a trusteeship tutelage, and thus have secured itself an equal status in the triangular contractual relationship between co-lessors and lessee. In order to gain the FFS' consent to engage in a lease, on the one hand, and for the NSA to qualify for lessee status, on the other hand, both parties must commit to abide by the law governing occupation. Thus the lease is contingent upon fulfillment of the respective duties of the occupied and the occupier. The lease situation adds certainty to an unclear FFS situation107 for "[ilnternational servitudes and territorial leases exploit the gaps in these notions [re. territorial issues] and add something new to their scope . . . . [Wlhile they may be considered marginal aspects of international law and international relations, they in fact are pushing those margins outward and causing both to expand."'08 ' " I.e., expanded occupation as argued earlier herein.
' 05 The status of NSAs is no doubt intricately connected to this Paper's discussion of occupation and trusteeship. This is however beyond the scope of the present Paper which, at this stage, contends with exploring and proposing an innovative general framework to new challenges. lob "Lease-like" since the lessor (or guarantor of the lease) in such case is not the sovereign having legal title to the territory. '07 The principal elements of the lease would be clearly defined when entering a lease agreement.
For 
IV. Conclusion
Extant occupation law has been discarded for want of political appeal and the hurdles challenging enforcement. This Paper explores a new approach to addressing situations that "look like" occupation, but fall in between the international legal cracks separating international from non-international armed conflicts. In this paper, I propose to consider the formulation of a new legal term, namely suspended sovereignty. Suspended sovereignty arises where the sovereign is denied control over part of, or the entire, state temtory due to (a) para-military control by a NSA therein, and where the situation cannot be characterized as a non-international armed conflict; (b) foreign military indirect control but no direct armed confrontation with the state's military or other armed forces; and (c) the sovereign did not formally andlor freely consent to the foreign intervention. I also maintain that this term will lead to an expansion of the legal doctrine of occupation. The combination of recognizing the condition of suspended sovereignty as (a) a legal state of conflict and temporary void of government (fragilelfailed state); (b) a legal order authorizing the peaceful intervention by a third party to re-establish sovereignty; and coupling it with twentyfirst century adapted legal instruments of leasehold and trusteeship, proposes a reform to the current legal doctrine of occupation.
My argument takes advantage of two recent legal and political discourses: The FFS and the R2P. I propose focusing on the key concept of sovereignty, which underlies the debates surrounding FFS and R2P. Such reconsiderations must address two cardinal issues: Sovereignty as an operative condition and sovereignty as a status conferred also on NSA and the international organization. I advance the proposition that a FFS condition and the R2P duty represent both sides of the same coin labeled "sovereignty." Therefore, their articulation is mandatory for ascertaining a state of suspended sovereignty as well as the contemplation of legal means to revive once suspended sovereignty. Such legal development will take advantage of the available legal instrument of international trusteeship and leasehold. These should be considered as a means to peacefully establish the rule of law in the FFS territory, and build the confidence necessary to arrive at a long lasting resolution of a conflict and restore the FFS plenary sovereignty.
